Comparer des méthodes

	Algorithme de Gale-Shapley	Modèle Principal-Agent
Domaine	Théorie des jeux	Théorie des jeux
Famille	Machine learning	Machine learning
Année d'origine	1962	1976
Auteur d'origine	David Gale, Lloyd Shapley	Michael Jensen, William Meckling, Bengt Holmstrom
Type	algorithm	algorithm
Source fondatrice	Gale, D., & Shapley, L. S. (1962). College admissions and the stability of marriage. The American Mathematical Monthly, 69(1), 9-15.	Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360.
Alias	Stable Marriage Problem, Deferred Acceptance, Two-Sided Matching	Agency Theory, Hidden Action Problem, Moral Hazard
Apparentées	4	4
Résumé	The Gale-Shapley algorithm solves the stable marriage problem: how to match two groups (e.g., medical residents to hospitals, students to schools) such that no pair prefers each other to their assigned partners. Introduced by David Gale and Lloyd Shapley in 1962, the algorithm guarantees a stable matching in polynomial time through a deferred acceptance process where one side proposes sequentially and the other side responds, revising choices as better options arrive.	The Principal-Agent Model analyzes how a principal (e.g., owner, employer, policymaker) can incentivize an agent (e.g., manager, employee, firm) to act in the principal's interest when the agent has private information or can take hidden actions. Formalized by Jensen and Meckling in 1976, the model identifies agency costs arising from moral hazard (the agent exerts less effort than desired) and adverse selection (the agent hides unfavorable information). Optimal contracts balance incentives with risk allocation.