The Good and the Right
The relation between the good and the right concerns whether the rightness of actions is to be explained in terms of the goodness they promote, or whether the right is independent of and prior to the good.
Definition
A theory affirms the priority of the good when it defines the right in terms of the good, holding that right acts are those that produce the most good; it affirms the priority of the right when it treats some deontic requirements as independent of, and constraining, the pursuit of the good.
Scope
This topic covers the structural question of how the deontic notion of right action relates to the evaluative notion of the good: the teleological reduction of the right to the good, the deontological priority of the right, and the buck-passing analysis of value in terms of reasons. It clarifies a divide that distinguishes consequentialist from deontological and contractualist theories at the most general level.
Core questions
- Is the right definable in terms of, and explained by, the good?
- Can there be constraints on promoting the good that are themselves not grounded in value?
- Does the value of a state of affairs reduce to reasons for favouring it?
- How does the priority of the right shape theories of justice?
Key theories
- The priority of the right
- The deontological and Rawlsian thesis that principles of right constrain the conceptions of the good that may permissibly be pursued, rather than the right being derived from a prior account of the good.
- The buck-passing account of value
- Scanlon's analysis on which to be good is to have properties that provide reasons to respond favourably, so value is explained in terms of reasons rather than the reverse.
History
The teleological tradition, paradigmatically utilitarian, defines the right as what maximizes the good. Ross (1930) titled his major work to mark the contrast, and Rawls (1971) made the priority of the right over the good a defining feature of his theory of justice. Scanlon (1998) added the buck-passing account, reorienting the analysis of value toward reasons.
Debates
- Teleology vs. the priority of the right
- Consequentialists hold that the right is wholly explained by the good, while deontologists insist some requirements constrain the pursuit of the good; the dispute marks the deepest division in normative theory.
- The buck-passing analysis
- Scanlon's reduction of value to reasons is challenged by the worry that it leaves out the way a thing's goodness itself seems to provide the reason, raising the 'wrong kind of reason' problem.
Key figures
- W. D. Ross
- John Rawls
- T. M. Scanlon
- Philippa Foot
Related topics
Seminal works
- ross1930
- rawls1971
- scanlon1998
Frequently asked questions
- What is the priority of the right over the good?
- It is the deontological and Rawlsian thesis that principles of right action and justice are not derived from a prior conception of the good but instead set limits on which conceptions of the good people may permissibly pursue.
- What is buck-passing about value?
- It is Scanlon's view that calling something good is not to ascribe a special value property but to say it has other properties that give us reasons to respond to it favourably, so the analysis of value 'passes the buck' to reasons.