Sense and Reference
Frege's distinction between sense and reference separates the object an expression designates from the mode by which it is presented.
Definition
The reference of an expression is the object it designates; its sense is the mode of presentation of that object, the way the referent is given.
Scope
This topic covers the foundational distinction between sense (Sinn) and reference (Bedeutung), the puzzles it was designed to solve (the informativeness of identity statements, substitution failures in attitude contexts, and meaningful but non-referring expressions), and Russell's competing theory of descriptions, which analyses definite descriptions as quantificational rather than referring expressions. It frames the central question of how linguistic expressions relate to the world and to thought.
Core questions
- Why is 'the morning star is the evening star' informative while 'the morning star is the morning star' is trivial?
- How can expressions be meaningful yet fail to refer?
- Are definite descriptions referring expressions or disguised quantifiers?
- How does sense determine reference?
Key concepts
- sense (Sinn) and reference (Bedeutung)
- mode of presentation
- Frege's puzzle about identity
- definite description
- existence and uniqueness conditions
- empty / non-referring terms
Key theories
- Fregean sense and reference
- Every meaningful expression has a sense (mode of presentation) in addition to its reference; co-referring expressions can differ in sense, which explains the cognitive significance of identity statements.
- Russell's theory of descriptions
- A definite description like 'the present king of France' is not a referring term but contributes existential and uniqueness conditions, so sentences containing empty descriptions are meaningful and false rather than truth-valueless.
History
Frege's 1892 paper 'Uber Sinn und Bedeutung' introduced the sense/reference distinction to solve puzzles about identity and substitution. Russell's 1905 'On Denoting' offered a rival analysis of denoting phrases, and Strawson later criticized Russell by arguing that reference failure yields presupposition failure rather than falsity, a debate that connects this topic to presupposition.
Debates
- Referential vs. quantificational analysis of descriptions
- Whether definite descriptions are genuine referring expressions (broadly Fregean/Strawsonian) or quantifier phrases contributing existence and uniqueness conditions (Russellian).
Key figures
- Gottlob Frege
- Bertrand Russell
- P. F. Strawson
Related topics
Seminal works
- frege1892
- russell1905
Frequently asked questions
- What is Frege's puzzle?
- It is the puzzle that 'a = a' is trivial and uninformative while 'a = b' can be informative even when a and b refer to the same object, which Frege explained by saying the two names differ in sense though not in reference.