Definite Descriptions and Names

Russell analyzed 'the so-and-so' as a quantifier rather than a referring term, and Kripke argued that proper names refer rigidly without the mediation of descriptions.

Definition

A definite description is a phrase of the form 'the F'; the central question is whether such phrases, and proper names, are genuine referring terms or are analyzed away into quantificational and descriptive content.

Scope

This topic covers the logic and semantics of definite descriptions and proper names. It treats Russell's theory of descriptions, which analyzes 'the F is G' as a quantified claim about unique existence rather than a singular reference, Donnellan's referential/attributive distinction, the descriptivist theory of names and Kripke's modal, epistemic, and semantic arguments against it, and the resulting causal-historical and rigid-designation accounts of how names secure their reference.

Core questions

• Are definite descriptions referring terms or disguised quantifiers?
• Is there a semantic difference between referential and attributive uses of descriptions?
• Do proper names mean the same as associated descriptions?
• How do names manage to refer rigidly across possible worlds?

Key concepts

• theory of descriptions
• scope ambiguity
• referential vs. attributive use
• descriptivism
• rigid designation
• the modal and epistemic arguments

Key theories

Russell's theory of descriptions

Russell analyzes 'the F is G' as 'there is exactly one F and it is G', so a description is not a referring term but a quantificational structure; this dissolves puzzles about non-denoting descriptions and apparent reference to nonexistents.

Rigid designation and anti-descriptivism

Kripke argues by modal, epistemic, and semantic considerations that names are rigid designators not synonymous with any description, and that their reference is fixed by a causal-historical chain rather than descriptive fit.

History

Russell's 1905 'On Denoting' offered the paradigm of logical analysis for the analytic tradition. Strawson challenged it with presupposition in 1950, Donnellan added the referential/attributive distinction in 1966, and Kripke's 1970 lectures (published 1980) overturned the descriptivist orthodoxy about names in favour of rigid designation.

Debates

Quantificational vs. referential descriptions

Whether definite descriptions are uniformly quantificational, as Russell holds, or whether Donnellan's referential uses show that descriptions can function as devices of singular reference, bearing on the semantics-pragmatics boundary.

Key figures

• Bertrand Russell
• Saul Kripke
• Keith Donnellan
• P. F. Strawson
• Gottlob Frege

Seminal works

• russell1905
• kripke1980

Frequently asked questions

What is a rigid designator?

A rigid designator is a term that refers to the same object in every possible world in which that object exists. Kripke argues that proper names are rigid, whereas most definite descriptions are not — 'the inventor of bifocals' could have designated someone other than Franklin, but the name 'Franklin' could not have designated anyone else.