What is an agent-relative constraint?

It is a moral restriction that tells each agent not to perform a certain kind of act, such as killing the innocent, even when violating it once would prevent more such acts by others.

How do constraints differ from options?

Constraints forbid certain acts regardless of the good they might produce, whereas options (or prerogatives) permit an agent to refrain from maximizing the good in favour of their own projects.

Agent-Relative Constraints and Options

Agent-relative constraints forbid an agent from performing certain acts, such as killing an innocent, even to prevent more such acts by others, while agent-relative options permit an agent to favour their own interests.

Definition

An agent-relative constraint is a moral restriction directing each agent not to perform a certain type of act even when doing so would minimize the total number of such acts; an agent-relative option is a permission allowing an agent to act on personal reasons that need not be impartially optimal.

Scope

This topic covers the deontic structure that distinguishes deontology from consequentialism: agent-relative constraints (restrictions) that prohibit acts independent of outcomes, agent-relative options (prerogatives) that permit not maximizing the good, and the contrast with the agent-neutral reasons of consequentialism. It addresses the so-called paradox of deontology and the theoretical work needed to vindicate constraints.

Core questions

How can it be wrong to violate a constraint even to prevent several comparable violations?
What distinguishes agent-relative reasons from the agent-neutral reasons of consequentialism?
Do agents have options to favour their own projects as well as constraints on harming?
Are constraints grounded in the rights of victims, the agency of the actor, or both?

Key theories

Agent-relative reasons: Nagel's analysis distinguishing agent-relative reasons, which refer essentially to the agent who has them, from agent-neutral reasons, and locating deontological constraints among the former.
The hybrid theory of options and constraints: Scheffler's project of grounding agent-centred prerogatives while questioning whether parallel constraints can be similarly justified, sharpening the asymmetry between options and restrictions.

History

Nagel (1986) gave the canonical analysis of agent-relative versus agent-neutral reasons, locating deontological constraints in the former. Scheffler (1982) argued that while agent-centred prerogatives are defensible, constraints are harder to justify, posing the 'paradox of deontology.' Kamm (2007) developed an intricate theory of permissible harm aimed at vindicating constraints through the rights and inviolability of persons.

Debates

The paradox of deontology: If violating a constraint is bad, minimizing such violations should be good; explaining why an agent may not violate one constraint to prevent several is the central theoretical challenge.
Grounding constraints in inviolability: Kamm argues that constraints reflect the high moral status and inviolability of persons; critics question whether this status can be specified without circularity.

Key figures

Thomas Nagel
Samuel Scheffler
Frances Kamm
Warren Quinn

Seminal works

nagel1986
scheffler1982
kamm2007

Frequently asked questions

What is an agent-relative constraint?: It is a moral restriction that tells each agent not to perform a certain kind of act, such as killing the innocent, even when violating it once would prevent more such acts by others.
How do constraints differ from options?: Constraints forbid certain acts regardless of the good they might produce, whereas options (or prerogatives) permit an agent to refrain from maximizing the good in favour of their own projects.