Redistribution Preference Analysis
Redistribution preference analysis examines why individuals support or oppose government efforts to reduce inequality. The self-interest baseline comes from Meltzer and Richard's 1981 model, in which the demand for redistribution falls with one's own income because the rich pay more and receive less from transfers. Benabou and Ok's 2001 POUM (prospect of upward mobility) hypothesis adds a forward-looking twist: people who expect to climb the income ladder may oppose redistribution even when currently poor, because they anticipate being net payers tomorrow. A third strand emphasizes beliefs about fairness — whether success reflects effort or luck. The empirical method is an individual-level survey regression, typically ordered logit or multilevel, of redistribution attitudes on income, mobility expectations, beliefs, and contextual factors.
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Sources
- Meltzer, A. H., & Richard, S. F. (1981). A Rational Theory of the Size of Government. Journal of Political Economy, 89(5), 914-927. DOI: 10.1086/261013 ↗
- Benabou, R., & Ok, E. A. (2001). Social Mobility and the Demand for Redistribution: The POUM Hypothesis. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(2), 447-487. DOI: 10.1162/00335530151144078 ↗
How to cite this page
ScholarGate. (2026, June 22). Analysis of Individual Preferences for Redistribution. ScholarGate. https://scholargate.app/en/political-economy/redistribution-preference-analysis
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