Deterrence Modeling
Deterrence modeling uses game theory to analyze when a defender can dissuade a challenger from aggression by threatening unacceptable costs. Classical deterrence theory, rooted in Schelling's work and Cold War nuclear strategy, was reformulated by Frank Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour in Perfect Deterrence (2000) into a family of incomplete-information games. These models make precise the two requirements a deterrent threat must meet — capability (the means to inflict the cost) and credibility (a genuine willingness to carry it out) — and identify the equilibrium conditions under which deterrence succeeds, fails, or collapses into conflict.
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Sources
- Zagare, F. C., & Kilgour, D. M. (2000). Perfect Deterrence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN: 9780521781749 ↗
How to cite this page
ScholarGate. (2026, June 22). Game-Theoretic Modeling of Deterrence in International Relations. ScholarGate. https://scholargate.app/en/international-relations/deterrence-modeling-ir
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