Veto Player Analysis
Veto player analysis is a spatial-institutional framework, developed by George Tsebelis in his 1995 article and 2002 book, for predicting the capacity of a political system to change policy. A veto player is any individual or collective actor whose agreement is required to alter the status quo. The theory shows that the potential for policy change shrinks as the number of veto players grows, as the ideological distance between them widens, and as their internal cohesion increases — three structural variables that together determine a system's policy stability independently of constitutional labels such as presidentialism or parliamentarism.
Læs hele metoden
Log ind med en gratis konto for at læse dette afsnit.
Metodekort
Nabolaget af beslægtede metoder — vælg en knude for at udforske.
+4 mere
Kilder
- Tsebelis, G. (2002). Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton University Press. ISBN: 9780691091891
- Tsebelis, G. (1995). Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism. British Journal of Political Science, 25(3), 289-325. DOI: 10.1017/S0007123400007225 ↗
Sådan citerer du denne side
ScholarGate. (2026, June 22). Veto Player Theory and Analysis. ScholarGate. https://scholargate.app/da/political-science/veto-player-analysis
Hvilken metode?
Stil denne metode ved siden af dens nærmeste slægtninge, og læs dem side om side — biblioteket lægger bøgerne på bordet; valget er dit.
- Ideal Point EstimationPolitical Science↔ sammenlign
- Spatial Voting ModelPolitical Science↔ sammenlign
- Two-Level Game AnalysisPolitical Science↔ sammenlign
- Voting Power Index AnalysisPolitical Science↔ sammenlign
Refereret af
Lignende metoder
Har du fundet en fejl på denne side? Indberet den eller foreslå en rettelse →