Economic Voting Analysis
Economic voting analysis is the formal study of how voters reward or punish incumbents according to economic performance. In the reward-punishment (retrospective) model pioneered by Gerald Kramer in 1971, support for the governing party is a function of recent economic outcomes — growth, unemployment, and inflation — so that good times re-elect incumbents and bad times turn them out. Michael Lewis-Beck and Mary Stegmaier's 2000 review consolidated the field, establishing that economic voting is predominantly sociotropic (based on the national economy rather than personal finances) and that its strength depends on the clarity of responsibility: how easily voters can attribute outcomes to the incumbent.
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Kilder
- Kramer, G. H. (1971). Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896-1964. American Political Science Review, 65(1), 131-143. DOI: 10.2307/1955049 ↗
- Lewis-Beck, M. S., & Stegmaier, M. (2000). Economic Determinants of Electoral Outcomes. Annual Review of Political Science, 3, 183-219. DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.3.1.183 ↗
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ScholarGate. (2026, June 22). Economic Voting Model (Retrospective and Reward-Punishment). ScholarGate. https://scholargate.app/da/political-economy/economic-voting-analysis
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