Moral Motivation and Internalism
How moral judgement relates to motivation and reasons for action — and whether that link is necessary or contingent.
Definition
Moral motivation concerns the relationship between moral judgement and the will; internalism holds that there is a necessary, conceptual connection between sincerely judging an act right and being motivated (or having reason) to perform it, while externalism holds any such connection is contingent.
Scope
This area studies the practical dimension of metaethics: the connection between making a moral judgement and being moved to act. It covers judgement internalism and externalism, the Humean theory that belief alone cannot motivate, the dispute over internal versus external reasons, and rationalist and constructivist attempts to ground moral requirements in practical reason or agency. The debates bear directly on cognitivism, since the practicality of moral judgement is hard to reconcile with treating it as ordinary belief.
Sub-topics
Core questions
- Is there a necessary connection between moral judgement and motivation?
- Can a belief, by itself, move an agent to act, or is a desire always needed?
- Do an agent's reasons depend on their existing motivations, or can reasons be external to them?
- Can the authority of morality be grounded in the nature of rational agency?
Key concepts
- internalism vs. externalism
- the Humean theory of motivation
- internal vs. external reasons
- the practicality requirement
- amoralist
Key theories
- Judgement internalism
- It is conceptually guaranteed that someone who sincerely judges an action right is thereby at least somewhat motivated to do it; motivation is internal to moral judgement.
- The Humean theory of motivation
- Motivation requires a desire-like state in addition to belief, since beliefs alone are inert; this pressures cognitivists who also accept internalism.
- Constructivist rationalism
- Moral requirements derive their authority from the constitutive demands of rational agency or self-legislation, so a rational agent has reason and motivation to comply.
History
The issues trace to Hume's claim that reason is the slave of the passions and to Kant's opposing rationalism. They were sharpened in the late twentieth century by Williams's 1981 internal-reasons argument, Smith's 1994 formulation of 'the moral problem' as a trilemma of cognitivism, internalism, and the Humean theory, and Korsgaard's constructivist account of normative authority.
Debates
- Internalism versus externalism about judgement
- Internalists cite the apparent absurdity of sincerely judging an act wrong while feeling no pull against it; externalists point to the conceptual possibility of the amoralist who judges without being moved.
- Internal versus external reasons
- Williams argued all genuine reasons must connect to an agent's motivational set; rationalists hold there are reasons that apply regardless of present desires.
Key figures
- David Hume
- Bernard Williams
- Michael Smith
- Christine Korsgaard
Related topics
Seminal works
- hume1739
- williams1981
- smith1994
- korsgaard1996
Frequently asked questions
- Why does moral motivation matter for metaethics?
- Because moral judgements seem to be intrinsically practical — judging something wrong tends to move us — yet ordinary beliefs do not motivate by themselves. Explaining this practicality constrains theories of what moral judgements are and whether they describe facts.