Compara mètodes

	Equilibri Perfecte de Subjocs	Equilibri de Nash
Camp	Teoria de jocs	Teoria de jocs
Família	Machine learning	Machine learning
Any d'origen	1965	1950
Autor original	Reinhard Selten	John Nash
Tipus	algorithm	algorithm
Font seminal	Selten, R. (1965). Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfrageträgheit. Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 121, 301-324.	Nash, J. F. (1950). Equilibrium points in N-person games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 36(1), 48-49.
Àlies	Backward Induction, Sequential Equilibrium, Extensive-Form Equilibrium	Lemke-Howson Equilibrium, Completely Labeled Pair
Relacionats	4	4
Resum	Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) is a refinement of Nash Equilibrium for sequential games, introduced by Reinhard Selten in 1965. It requires that strategy profiles constitute a Nash Equilibrium in every subgame, eliminating non-credible threats and incredible promises. Backward induction is the primary computational method for finding SPE in finite games.	Nash Equilibrium is a game-theoretic solution concept where no player can unilaterally deviate to improve their payoff. Formalized by John Nash in 1950, the Lemke-Howson algorithm computationally finds equilibria in bimatrix games by identifying completely labeled vertex pairs in the strategy polytopes.