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| Equilibri de Nash× | Equilibri Perfecte de Subjocs× | |
|---|---|---|
| Camp | Teoria de jocs | Teoria de jocs |
| Família | Machine learning | Machine learning |
| Any d'origen≠ | 1950 | 1965 |
| Autor original≠ | John Nash | Reinhard Selten |
| Tipus | algorithm | algorithm |
| Font seminal≠ | Nash, J. F. (1950). Equilibrium points in N-person games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 36(1), 48-49. DOI ↗ | Selten, R. (1965). Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfrageträgheit. Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 121, 301-324. link ↗ |
| Àlies≠ | Lemke-Howson Equilibrium, Completely Labeled Pair | Backward Induction, Sequential Equilibrium, Extensive-Form Equilibrium |
| Relacionats | 4 | 4 |
| Resum≠ | Nash Equilibrium is a game-theoretic solution concept where no player can unilaterally deviate to improve their payoff. Formalized by John Nash in 1950, the Lemke-Howson algorithm computationally finds equilibria in bimatrix games by identifying completely labeled vertex pairs in the strategy polytopes. | Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) is a refinement of Nash Equilibrium for sequential games, introduced by Reinhard Selten in 1965. It requires that strategy profiles constitute a Nash Equilibrium in every subgame, eliminating non-credible threats and incredible promises. Backward induction is the primary computational method for finding SPE in finite games. |
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