方法证据记录
Side-Channel Analysis
Side-channel analysis is a family of attacks that exploit physical properties of cryptographic implementations (timing, power consumption, electromagnetic emissions, cache behavior) to recover secret keys. Introduced by Paul Kocher in 1996, side-channel attacks have repeatedly broken implementations of theoretically secure cryptosystems by leveraging unintended information leakage. Side-channel analysis has become a critical concern in cryptographic system design, requiring constant-time implementations and physical countermeasures.
源记录
引文逐字复制自方法源记录。这些引文不代表任何层级的验证。
Side-Channel Analysis
分类方法记录 · ml-model / cryptography
- Kocher, P. C. (1996). Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and other systems. In Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 1996, LNCS 1109, pp. 104-113. · DOI 10.1007/3-540-68697-5_9
- Kocher, P., Jaffe, J., & Jun, B. (1999). Differential power analysis. In Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 1999, LNCS 1666, pp. 388-397. · DOI 10.1007/3-540-48405-1_25
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