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侧信道分析

侧信道分析是一类攻击,它利用加密实现(时间、功耗、电磁辐射、缓存行为)的物理特性来恢复密钥。侧信道攻击由 Paul Kocher 于 1996 年提出,通过利用无意的泄露信息,反复攻破理论上安全的密码系统的实现。侧信道分析已成为密码系统设计中的关键问题,需要常数时间实现和物理对抗措施。

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来源

  1. Kocher, P. C. (1996). Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and other systems. In Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 1996, LNCS 1109, pp. 104-113. DOI: 10.1007/3-540-68697-5_9
  2. Kocher, P., Jaffe, J., & Jun, B. (1999). Differential power analysis. In Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 1999, LNCS 1666, pp. 388-397. DOI: 10.1007/3-540-48405-1_25

如何引用本页

ScholarGate. (2026, June 3). Side-Channel Analysis. ScholarGate. https://scholargate.app/zh/cryptography/side-channel-analysis

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被引用于

ScholarGateSide-Channel Analysis (Side-Channel Analysis). 于 2026-06-15 检索自 https://scholargate.app/zh/cryptography/side-channel-analysis · 数据集: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20539026