方法对比

	Rent-Seeking Analysis	Veto Player Analysis
领域	Political Economy	Political Science
方法族	MCDM	MCDM
起源年份	1967	1995
提出者	Gordon Tullock & Anne Krueger	George Tsebelis
类型	Formal model of political-economic waste	Comparative institutional analysis framework
开创性文献	Tullock, G. (1967). The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft. Western Economic Journal, 5(3), 224-232.	Tsebelis, G. (2002). Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton University Press. ISBN: 9780691091891
别名	Rent-Seeking Theory, Tullock Rent-Seeking Analysis, Rent-Seeking Contest Model, Directly Unproductive Profit-Seeking	Veto Players Theory, Veto Points Analysis, Tsebelis Veto Player Framework, Policy Stability Analysis
相关	4	4
摘要	Rent-seeking analysis is the political-economy framework for measuring the social waste created when individuals and firms spend real resources competing for artificially created rents — the extra income generated by monopoly grants, tariffs, licenses, quotas, and other government-conferred privileges — rather than producing new wealth. Gordon Tullock's 1967 article showed that the conventional Harberger triangle drastically understates the cost of monopoly and protection, because the rectangle of monopoly profit, far from being a mere transfer, becomes a prize that competitors will expend resources to capture. Anne Krueger named the activity 'rent-seeking' in 1974 and demonstrated its macroeconomic scale in regulated developing economies. The analysis models the competition for a rent as a contest and asks how much of the prize is dissipated in the struggle to win it.	Veto player analysis is a spatial-institutional framework, developed by George Tsebelis in his 1995 article and 2002 book, for predicting the capacity of a political system to change policy. A veto player is any individual or collective actor whose agreement is required to alter the status quo. The theory shows that the potential for policy change shrinks as the number of veto players grows, as the ideological distance between them widens, and as their internal cohesion increases — three structural variables that together determine a system's policy stability independently of constitutional labels such as presidentialism or parliamentarism.