方法对比

	Partisan Business Cycle Analysis	Political Budget Cycle Analysis
领域	Political Economy	Political Economy
方法族	Regression model	Regression model
起源年份	1977	1990
提出者	Douglas Hibbs (partisan theory); Alberto Alesina (rational partisan theory)	Kenneth Rogoff (building on William Nordhaus)
类型	Time-series econometric model of partisan macroeconomic outcomes	Panel econometric model of opportunistic fiscal policy
开创性文献	Hibbs, D. A. (1977). Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy. American Political Science Review, 71(4), 1467-1487.	Rogoff, K. (1990). Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles. American Economic Review, 80(1), 21-36.
别名	Partisan Theory Analysis, Rational Partisan Theory, Hibbs Partisan Model, Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy	Electoral Budget Cycle Analysis, Opportunistic Fiscal Cycle Model, Pre-Election Fiscal Manipulation Analysis, Election-Year Deficit Model
相关	3	3
摘要	Partisan business cycle analysis tests whether left-wing and right-wing governments produce systematically different macroeconomic outcomes. Douglas Hibbs's 1977 partisan theory argued that because left and right parties represent constituencies with different exposures to unemployment and inflation, left governments durably push for lower unemployment while tolerating higher inflation, and right governments do the reverse. Alberto Alesina's 1987 rational partisan theory added rational expectations and nominal wage contracts: when parties differ and election outcomes are uncertain, the surprise of who wins generates only a transitory burst of partisan divergence in output and employment, which fades once contracts adjust. The empirical method regresses macroeconomic series on a partisan government indicator and post-election dummies to distinguish permanent from transitory effects.	Political budget cycle analysis is an econometric framework for detecting whether incumbent governments manipulate fiscal policy — deficits, public spending, or taxes — in the run-up to elections to signal competence and win votes. Kenneth Rogoff's 1990 equilibrium model gave the idea rational micro-foundations: even forward-looking voters can be temporarily fooled when competence is imperfectly observed, so able incumbents distort the fiscal mix before an election to separate themselves from less able rivals. Empirically the cycle is identified by an election-timing indicator in a fixed-effects panel regression of fiscal outcomes, and Brender and Drazen's 2005 study showed the effect is concentrated in new, inexperienced democracies rather than established ones.