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| Government Formation Model× | Spatial Voting Model× | |
|---|---|---|
| 领域≠ | Political Economy | Political Science |
| 方法族 | MCDM | MCDM |
| 起源年份≠ | 1989 | 1957 |
| 提出者≠ | David Baron & John Ferejohn; David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey Banks | Harold Hotelling, Duncan Black & Anthony Downs |
| 类型≠ | Non-cooperative bargaining model of government formation | Formal model of electoral and legislative choice |
| 开创性文献≠ | Baron, D. P., & Ferejohn, J. A. (1989). Bargaining in Legislatures. American Political Science Review, 83(4), 1181-1206. DOI ↗ | Downs, A. (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. Harper & Row. ISBN: 9780060417505 |
| 别名 | Legislative Bargaining Model, Baron-Ferejohn Model, Formateur Model, Portfolio Allocation Model | Spatial Theory of Voting, Downsian Model, Proximity Voting Model, Median Voter Model |
| 相关 | 4 | 4 |
| 摘要≠ | The government formation model is a non-cooperative bargaining theory explaining how a cabinet and the division of its portfolios emerge when no party holds a majority. In the canonical Baron-Ferejohn (1989) framework, a head of state or chance mechanism recognizes one party as formateur with a probability often proportional to its seat share; the formateur proposes a government and an allocation of the spoils of office, and the proposal takes effect only if a legislative majority accepts. Austen-Smith and Banks (1988) embed this in an electoral and coalition setting. The model's signature result is a proposer (formateur) advantage: the party that gets to propose secures a disproportionate share of portfolios. | The spatial voting model represents voters and political alternatives as points in a common geometric policy space and assumes that each voter supports the alternative nearest to their own ideal point. Rooted in Hotelling's location theory, Duncan Black's 1948 single-peakedness result, and Anthony Downs's 1957 economic theory of democracy, the model yields two foundational results: the median voter theorem, which identifies the equilibrium policy in one dimension, and the Downsian prediction that two vote-seeking parties converge toward the center. It is the workhorse formalism behind modern empirical estimation of political positions. |
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