方法对比
并排查看您选择的方法；存在差异的行会高亮显示。
| Gale-Shapley 算法× | 委托× | |
|---|---|---|
| 领域 | 博弈论 | 博弈论 |
| 方法族 | Machine learning | Machine learning |
| 起源年份≠ | 1962 | 1976 |
| 提出者≠ | David Gale, Lloyd Shapley | Michael Jensen, William Meckling, Bengt Holmstrom |
| 类型 | algorithm | algorithm |
| 开创性文献≠ | Gale, D., & Shapley, L. S. (1962). College admissions and the stability of marriage. The American Mathematical Monthly, 69(1), 9-15. DOI ↗ | Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360. DOI ↗ |
| 别名 | Stable Marriage Problem, Deferred Acceptance, Two-Sided Matching | Agency Theory, Hidden Action Problem, Moral Hazard |
| 相关 | 4 | 4 |
| 摘要≠ | The Gale-Shapley algorithm solves the stable marriage problem: how to match two groups (e.g., medical residents to hospitals, students to schools) such that no pair prefers each other to their assigned partners. Introduced by David Gale and Lloyd Shapley in 1962, the algorithm guarantees a stable matching in polynomial time through a deferred acceptance process where one side proposes sequentially and the other side responds, revising choices as better options arrive. | The Principal-Agent Model analyzes how a principal (e.g., owner, employer, policymaker) can incentivize an agent (e.g., manager, employee, firm) to act in the principal's interest when the agent has private information or can take hidden actions. Formalized by Jensen and Meckling in 1976, the model identifies agency costs arising from moral hazard (the agent exerts less effort than desired) and adverse selection (the agent hides unfavorable information). Optimal contracts balance incentives with risk allocation. |
| ScholarGate数据集 ↗ |
|
|