方法对比

	Economic Voting Analysis	Probabilistic Voting Model
领域	Political Economy	Political Economy
方法族	MCDM	MCDM
起源年份	1971	1987
提出者	Gerald Kramer; Michael Lewis-Beck & Mary Stegmaier	Assar Lindbeck, Jörgen Weibull & Peter Coughlin
类型	Formal reward-punishment model of voting	Formal model of electoral competition
开创性文献	Kramer, G. H. (1971). Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896-1964. American Political Science Review, 65(1), 131-143.	Lindbeck, A., & Weibull, J. W. (1987). Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition. Public Choice, 52(3), 273-297.
别名	Reward-Punishment Model, Retrospective Voting Model, Economic Vote Function, Responsibility Hypothesis	Probabilistic Voting Theory, Lindbeck-Weibull Model, Coughlin Probabilistic Voting Model, Stochastic Voting Model
相关	4	4
摘要	Economic voting analysis is the formal study of how voters reward or punish incumbents according to economic performance. In the reward-punishment (retrospective) model pioneered by Gerald Kramer in 1971, support for the governing party is a function of recent economic outcomes — growth, unemployment, and inflation — so that good times re-elect incumbents and bad times turn them out. Michael Lewis-Beck and Mary Stegmaier's 2000 review consolidated the field, establishing that economic voting is predominantly sociotropic (based on the national economy rather than personal finances) and that its strength depends on the clarity of responsibility: how easily voters can attribute outcomes to the incumbent.	The probabilistic voting model is a formal theory of electoral competition in which each voter's choice between two parties is treated as stochastic rather than deterministic, governed by a smooth probability that depends on the policy utilities the parties offer plus idiosyncratic and partisan preference shocks. Developed by Assar Lindbeck and Jörgen Weibull in 1987 and given its general treatment by Peter Coughlin in 1992, the model replaces the knife-edge switching of the median voter framework with continuous vote-share functions. Two office-seeking parties maximize expected vote share, and the resulting equilibrium maximizes a density-weighted social welfare function in which the most responsive — the swing — voters carry the greatest weight. Crucially, the model delivers a determinate, interior equilibrium even in multidimensional policy spaces where a Condorcet winner generically fails to exist.