So sánh phương pháp

	Cân bằng Nash	Cân bằng hoàn hảo trong trò chơi con
Lĩnh vực	Lý thuyết trò chơi	Lý thuyết trò chơi
Họ	Machine learning	Machine learning
Năm ra đời	1950	1965
Người khởi xướng	John Nash	Reinhard Selten
Loại	algorithm	algorithm
Công trình gốc	Nash, J. F. (1950). Equilibrium points in N-person games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 36(1), 48-49.	Selten, R. (1965). Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfrageträgheit. Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 121, 301-324.
Tên gọi khác	Lemke-Howson Equilibrium, Completely Labeled Pair	Backward Induction, Sequential Equilibrium, Extensive-Form Equilibrium
Liên quan	4	4
Tóm tắt	Nash Equilibrium is a game-theoretic solution concept where no player can unilaterally deviate to improve their payoff. Formalized by John Nash in 1950, the Lemke-Howson algorithm computationally finds equilibria in bimatrix games by identifying completely labeled vertex pairs in the strategy polytopes.	Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) is a refinement of Nash Equilibrium for sequential games, introduced by Reinhard Selten in 1965. It requires that strategy profiles constitute a Nash Equilibrium in every subgame, eliminating non-credible threats and incredible promises. Backward induction is the primary computational method for finding SPE in finite games.