Virtue Ethics
Virtue ethics is the family of normative theories that takes character and the virtues, rather than rules or consequences, as the primary subject of moral evaluation.
Definition
A normative theory is a virtue ethics if it treats the virtues, or the character traits of a fully virtuous agent, as explanatorily and evaluatively prior, so that what one ought to do is understood through what a virtuous person would characteristically do.
Scope
This area covers character-based normative theories: the Aristotelian tradition and its modern revival, the analysis of what a virtue is, the role of eudaimonia or flourishing as the foundation of value, and how a virtue-centred theory can guide action. It treats virtue ethics as a rival to consequentialism and deontology rather than as a mere supplement.
Sub-topics
Core questions
- What is a virtue, and how do the virtues relate to one another and to practical wisdom?
- Should character, rather than acts or rules, be the central object of moral assessment?
- How does human flourishing ground the goodness of the virtues?
- Can a virtue-centred theory provide adequate guidance about what to do?
Key theories
- Aristotelian eudaimonism
- The view that the virtues are stable traits constitutive of and conducive to eudaimonia, the flourishing characteristic of a well-lived human life, exercised under the direction of practical wisdom.
- Neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics
- Hursthouse's contemporary reconstruction, which derives action guidance from what the virtuous agent would do and grounds the virtues in an objective account of human flourishing.
History
Virtue ethics descends from Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and was central to ancient and medieval thought before being eclipsed by modern rule-based theories. Anscombe (1958) catalysed its twentieth-century revival by arguing that deontic concepts of obligation are unintelligible without a divine lawgiver and urging a return to the virtues. Foot, MacIntyre, and Hursthouse (1999) then developed systematic neo-Aristotelian theories.
Debates
- The action-guidance objection
- Critics charge that telling agents to do what a virtuous person would do gives no usable guidance; defenders reply that the virtue concepts (honest, just, courageous) yield concrete v-rules.
- The situationist challenge
- Findings in social psychology suggesting behaviour is driven by situations more than by stable traits have been pressed as evidence that the robust character traits virtue ethics posits may not exist.
Key figures
- Aristotle
- G. E. M. Anscombe
- Philippa Foot
- Rosalind Hursthouse
- Alasdair MacIntyre
Related topics
Seminal works
- aristotleNE
- anscombe1958
- hursthouse1999
Frequently asked questions
- How does virtue ethics differ from deontology and consequentialism?
- Rather than centring on rules of duty or the maximization of good outcomes, virtue ethics treats the character of the agent as primary and understands right action in terms of what a virtuous person would characteristically do.
- Does virtue ethics tell you what to do?
- Defenders argue it does: the virtue and vice concepts generate 'v-rules' such as 'do what is honest' and 'do not do what is cruel,' which guide action much as ordinary moral rules do.