เปรียบเทียบวิธี
ดูวิธีที่เลือกเทียบกันแบบเคียงข้าง แถวที่ต่างกันจะถูกเน้นไว้
| Top Trading Cycles× | กลไก VCG (VCG Mechanism)× | |
|---|---|---|
| สาขาวิชา | ทฤษฎีเกม | ทฤษฎีเกม |
| ตระกูล | Machine learning | Machine learning |
| ปีกำเนิด≠ | 1974 | 1961 |
| ผู้ริเริ่ม≠ | Lloyd Shapley, Herbert Scarf | William Vickrey, Edward Clarke, Theodore Groves |
| ประเภท | algorithm | algorithm |
| แหล่งต้นตำรับ≠ | Shapley, L. S., & Scarf, H. (1974). On cores and indivisibility. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1(1), 23-37. DOI ↗ | Vickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed bids. The Journal of Finance, 16(1), 8-37. DOI ↗ |
| ชื่อเรียกอื่น | TTC, Shapley-Scarf Algorithm, Efficient Exchange | Vickrey Mechanism, Generalized Vickrey Auction, Truthful Mechanism |
| ที่เกี่ยวข้อง | 4 | 4 |
| สรุป≠ | Top Trading Cycles (TTC) is an algorithm for allocating indivisible goods to agents such that the allocation is Pareto efficient and individually rational. Developed by Lloyd Shapley and Herbert Scarf in 1974, the algorithm identifies cycles of trades in a preference digraph, executes those trades, and iteratively repeats until no further trades are beneficial. TTC is widely used in kidney exchange and housing allocation due to its efficiency and implementation simplicity. | The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) Mechanism is a truthful mechanism design solution that allocates resources and determines payments to incentivize participants to reveal their true valuations. Building on William Vickrey's 1961 sealed-bid auction work and extended by Clarke and Groves, VCG ensures that reporting truth is a dominant strategy for all participants, achieving allocative efficiency while maximizing total surplus. |
| ScholarGateชุดข้อมูล ↗ |
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