เปรียบเทียบวิธี
ดูวิธีที่เลือกเทียบกันแบบเคียงข้าง แถวที่ต่างกันจะถูกเน้นไว้
| Economic Voting Analysis× | Spatial Voting Model× | |
|---|---|---|
| สาขาวิชา≠ | Political Economy | Political Science |
| ตระกูล | MCDM | MCDM |
| ปีกำเนิด≠ | 1971 | 1957 |
| ผู้ริเริ่ม≠ | Gerald Kramer; Michael Lewis-Beck & Mary Stegmaier | Harold Hotelling, Duncan Black & Anthony Downs |
| ประเภท≠ | Formal reward-punishment model of voting | Formal model of electoral and legislative choice |
| แหล่งต้นตำรับ≠ | Kramer, G. H. (1971). Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896-1964. American Political Science Review, 65(1), 131-143. DOI ↗ | Downs, A. (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. Harper & Row. ISBN: 9780060417505 |
| ชื่อเรียกอื่น | Reward-Punishment Model, Retrospective Voting Model, Economic Vote Function, Responsibility Hypothesis | Spatial Theory of Voting, Downsian Model, Proximity Voting Model, Median Voter Model |
| ที่เกี่ยวข้อง | 4 | 4 |
| สรุป≠ | Economic voting analysis is the formal study of how voters reward or punish incumbents according to economic performance. In the reward-punishment (retrospective) model pioneered by Gerald Kramer in 1971, support for the governing party is a function of recent economic outcomes — growth, unemployment, and inflation — so that good times re-elect incumbents and bad times turn them out. Michael Lewis-Beck and Mary Stegmaier's 2000 review consolidated the field, establishing that economic voting is predominantly sociotropic (based on the national economy rather than personal finances) and that its strength depends on the clarity of responsibility: how easily voters can attribute outcomes to the incumbent. | The spatial voting model represents voters and political alternatives as points in a common geometric policy space and assumes that each voter supports the alternative nearest to their own ideal point. Rooted in Hotelling's location theory, Duncan Black's 1948 single-peakedness result, and Anthony Downs's 1957 economic theory of democracy, the model yields two foundational results: the median voter theorem, which identifies the equilibrium policy in one dimension, and the Downsian prediction that two vote-seeking parties converge toward the center. It is the workhorse formalism behind modern empirical estimation of political positions. |
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