Linganisha mbinu

	Transaction Cost Analysis in the Public Sector	Principal-Agent Analysis in the Public Sector
Nyanja	Public Administration	Public Administration
Familia	Process / pipeline	Process / pipeline
Mwaka wa asili	1981	1984
Mwanzilishi	Oliver E. Williamson	Terry M. Moe
Aina	Institutional-economics analysis	Institutional-economics analysis
Chanzo asilia	Williamson, O. E. (1981). The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach. American Journal of Sociology, 87(3), 548–577.	Moe, T. M. (1984). The New Economics of Organization. American Journal of Political Science, 28(4), 739–777.
Majina mbadala	Public Transaction Cost Economics, Make-or-Buy Analysis in Government, Transaction Cost Governance Analysis	Public Principal-Agent Analysis, Agency Theory in Government, Political Control Delegation Analysis
Zinazohusiana	4	4
Muhtasari	Transaction cost analysis in the public sector applies the economics of organisation to decisions about how government should structure the provision of goods and services — in house, by contract, or through hybrid arrangements. Oliver Williamson's 1981 article The Economics of Organization set out the transaction-cost approach, arguing that the choice of governance structure should economise on the costs of negotiating, monitoring and enforcing exchanges, not just on production costs. The method identifies the relevant transaction, assesses its attributes such as asset specificity and uncertainty, enumerates the governance alternatives, and aligns the structure to the transaction so that total cost is minimised. Its purpose is to explain and guide make-or-buy and contracting decisions in public administration.	Principal-agent analysis in the public sector applies agency theory to the chains of delegation that run through government — from voters to legislators, legislators to executives, and executives to bureaucracies. Terry Moe's 1984 article The New Economics of Organization brought this institutional-economics lens into the study of public bureaucracy, asking how political principals can control agents who have their own interests and superior information. The method identifies the principal and agent, specifies how their goals diverge, characterises the information asymmetry between them, and examines the control mechanisms principals use to limit agency losses. Its purpose is to explain bureaucratic behaviour and the design of oversight as the predictable result of delegation under conflicting incentives.