ScholarGate
Msaidizi

Linganisha mbinu

Pitia mbinu ulizochagua bega kwa bega; safu zinazotofautiana zinaangaziwa.

Mnada wa Bei ya Kwanza×Ushindani wa Stackelberg×
NyanjaNadharia ya MichezoNadharia ya Michezo
FamiliaMachine learningMachine learning
Mwaka wa asili19611934
MwanzilishiWilliam VickreyHeinrich von Stackelberg
Ainaalgorithmalgorithm
Chanzo asiliaVickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed bids. The Journal of Finance, 16(1), 8-37. DOI ↗von Stackelberg, H. (1934). Marktform und Gleichgewicht. Julius Springer. link ↗
Majina mbadalaFPSB, Sealed-Bid Auction, Bid-Equal-Price AuctionQuantity Leadership, Sequential Oligopoly, Stackelberg Equilibrium
Zinazohusiana44
MuhtasariA first-price auction is a sealed-bid mechanism where all participants submit bids simultaneously without knowing others' bids. The highest bidder wins and pays their own bid (the price they offered). Systematically analyzed by William Vickrey in 1961, first-price auctions require bidders to balance between winning and profit, leading to strategic underbidding relative to true valuations in equilibrium.Stackelberg Competition models sequential oligopolistic markets where one firm (the leader) commits to a quantity first, and other firms (followers) observe this choice and respond. Introduced by Heinrich von Stackelberg in 1934, the model captures first-mover advantage in quantity-setting competition. The resulting Stackelberg Equilibrium, found by backward induction, yields the leader higher profit than simultaneous (Cournot) competition.
ScholarGateSeti ya data
  1. v1
  2. 2 Vyanzo
  3. PUBLISHED
  1. v1
  2. 2 Vyanzo
  3. PUBLISHED

Nenda kwenye utafutaji Pakua slaidi

ScholarGateLinganisha mbinu: First-Price Auction · Stackelberg Competition. Imepatikana 2026-06-19 kutoka https://scholargate.app/sw/compare