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Shapley-värde×Nashjämvikt×
ÄmnesområdeSpelteoriSpelteori
FamiljMachine learningMachine learning
Ursprungsår19531950
UpphovspersonLloyd ShapleyJohn Nash
Typalgorithmalgorithm
UrsprungskällaShapley, L. S. (1953). A value for n-person games. In H. W. Kuhn & A. W. Tucker (Eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games II (pp. 307-317). Princeton University Press. DOI ↗Nash, J. F. (1950). Equilibrium points in N-person games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 36(1), 48-49. DOI ↗
AliasFair Division, Cooperative Game Solution, Dividend VectorLemke-Howson Equilibrium, Completely Labeled Pair
Närliggande44
SammanfattningThe Shapley Value is a solution concept for coalition games that distributes total payoff fairly among players based on their marginal contributions to coalitions. Introduced by Lloyd Shapley in 1953, the Shapley Value is the unique payoff distribution that satisfies four intuitive axioms: efficiency (total payoff is distributed), symmetry (identical players receive equal payoff), null player (players contributing nothing receive nothing), and additivity across games.Nash Equilibrium is a game-theoretic solution concept where no player can unilaterally deviate to improve their payoff. Formalized by John Nash in 1950, the Lemke-Howson algorithm computationally finds equilibria in bimatrix games by identifying completely labeled vertex pairs in the strategy polytopes.
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ScholarGateJämför metoder: Shapley Value · Nash Equilibrium. Hämtad 2026-06-18 från https://scholargate.app/sv/compare