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| Richardson Arms Race Model× | Deterrence Modeling× | |
|---|---|---|
| Ämnesområde | International Relations | International Relations |
| Familj | MCDM | MCDM |
| Ursprungsår≠ | 1960 | 2000 |
| Upphovsperson≠ | Lewis Fry Richardson | Classical deterrence theorists (Schelling); formal perfect deterrence by Frank Zagare & D. Marc Kilgour |
| Typ≠ | Coupled linear differential-equation dynamic model | Game-theoretic model of threat-based conflict prevention |
| Ursprungskälla≠ | Richardson, L. F. (1960). Arms and Insecurity: A Mathematical Study of the Causes and Origins of War (N. Rashevsky & E. Trucco, Eds.). Pittsburgh: Boxwood Press; Chicago: Quadrangle Books. link ↗ | Zagare, F. C., & Kilgour, D. M. (2000). Perfect Deterrence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. link ↗ |
| Alias | Richardson Arms Race Equations, Arms Race Dynamics Model, Action-Reaction Arms Model, Richardson Model of Arms Competition | Deterrence Theory Modeling, Rational Deterrence Models, Perfect Deterrence Game, Extended Deterrence Analysis |
| Närliggande | 3 | 3 |
| Sammanfattning≠ | The Richardson arms race model, set out by Lewis Fry Richardson in Arms and Insecurity (1960), is a pair of coupled differential equations describing how two rival states adjust their armaments over time. Each state's rate of arming rises with the rival's level of arms (action–reaction fear), falls with the burden of its own existing arms (fatigue or economic constraint), and is shifted by underlying grievance or goodwill. Analyzing the system reveals whether an arms race converges to a stable equilibrium or spirals upward without bound, making it the foundational mathematical model of arms competition. | Deterrence modeling uses game theory to analyze when a defender can dissuade a challenger from aggression by threatening unacceptable costs. Classical deterrence theory, rooted in Schelling's work and Cold War nuclear strategy, was reformulated by Frank Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour in Perfect Deterrence (2000) into a family of incomplete-information games. These models make precise the two requirements a deterrent threat must meet — capability (the means to inflict the cost) and credibility (a genuine willingness to carry it out) — and identify the equilibrium conditions under which deterrence succeeds, fails, or collapses into conflict. |
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