Theory Change and Scientific Revolutions
This area studies how scientific theories change over time and whether such change constitutes rational, cumulative progress.
Definition
Theory change is the historical process by which scientific theories are developed, modified, and replaced; a scientific revolution is a non-cumulative episode in which an older paradigm is wholly or partly displaced by an incompatible new one.
Scope
It covers Kuhn's model of normal science punctuated by revolutions, the incommensurability of successive paradigms, the theory-ladenness of observation, and competing accounts of scientific progress as accumulation of truth, problem-solving capacity, or empirical success.
Sub-topics
Core questions
- Is scientific change cumulative or marked by discontinuous revolutions?
- Are successive paradigms comparable, or incommensurable?
- Does observation provide a theory-neutral basis for adjudicating theories?
- In what sense, if any, does science make progress?
Key concepts
- normal science
- paradigm shift
- incommensurability
- theory-ladenness
- scientific progress
- anomaly and crisis
Key theories
- Paradigms and revolutions
- Kuhn argues that science alternates between long periods of paradigm-bound normal science and revolutionary shifts in which one paradigm replaces another.
- Incommensurability
- Kuhn and Feyerabend hold that the concepts and standards of rival paradigms can fail to translate into one another, complicating their comparison.
- Problem-solving model of progress
- Laudan analyses scientific progress as growth in effective problem-solving rather than approach to truth.
History
Hanson's 1958 theory-ladenness thesis prepared the ground for Kuhn's 1962 Structure of Scientific Revolutions, which, together with Feyerabend's parallel work on incommensurability, challenged the cumulative picture of science. Subsequent debate, including Laudan's 1977 problem-solving model, has sought to reconcile change with progress.
Debates
- Is scientific change rational and progressive?
- Kuhn's revolutionary, incommensurability-laden picture suggested relativist readings, while Laudan and others defend an account on which change is rational because it improves problem-solving effectiveness.
Key figures
- Thomas Kuhn
- Paul Feyerabend
- Norwood Russell Hanson
- Larry Laudan
Related topics
Seminal works
- kuhn1962
- hanson1958
- laudan1977
Frequently asked questions
- Did Kuhn think science is irrational?
- No. Kuhn resisted relativist readings of his work, insisting that paradigm choice is governed by shared values such as accuracy, scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness, even though these values do not function as an algorithm and can be weighed differently by different scientists.