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Potpun podigre Nešov ekvilibrijum×Evoluciona teorija igara×
OblastTeorija igaraTeorija igara
PorodicaMachine learningMachine learning
Godina nastanka19651973
TvoracReinhard SeltenJohn Maynard Smith, George Price
Tipalgorithmalgorithm
Temeljni izvorSelten, R. (1965). Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfrageträgheit. Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 121, 301-324. link ↗Smith, J. M., & Price, G. R. (1973). The logic of animal conflict. Nature, 246(5427), 15-18. DOI ↗
Drugi naziviBackward Induction, Sequential Equilibrium, Extensive-Form EquilibriumESS, Evolutionarily Stable Strategy, Replicator Dynamics
Srodne44
SažetakSubgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) is a refinement of Nash Equilibrium for sequential games, introduced by Reinhard Selten in 1965. It requires that strategy profiles constitute a Nash Equilibrium in every subgame, eliminating non-credible threats and incredible promises. Backward induction is the primary computational method for finding SPE in finite games.Evolutionary Game Theory applies game-theoretic reasoning to biological evolution and social dynamics, where populations of agents with different strategies interact repeatedly. Introduced by John Maynard Smith and George Price in 1973, the framework uses the concept of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESS) to identify strategy distributions that cannot be invaded by mutant strategies. Replicator dynamics describe how strategy frequencies evolve over time when reproduction is proportional to payoff success.
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ScholarGateUporedite metode: Subgame Perfect Equilibrium · Evolutionary Game Theory. Preuzeto 2026-06-18 sa https://scholargate.app/sr/compare