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| Sanctions Effectiveness Analysis× | Selectorate Theory Analysis× | |
|---|---|---|
| Oblast | International Relations | International Relations |
| Porodica≠ | Process / pipeline | MCDM |
| Godina nastanka≠ | 2007 | 2003 |
| Tvorac≠ | Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott, Kimberly Elliott & Barbara Oegg (HSE/HSEO dataset) | Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph Siverson & James Morrow |
| Tip≠ | Coding and statistical analysis of sanctions episodes and outcomes | Formal theory of leader survival and policy choice |
| Temeljni izvor≠ | Hufbauer, G. C., Schott, J. J., Elliott, K. A., & Oegg, B. (2007). Economic Sanctions Reconsidered (3rd ed.). Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics. link ↗ | Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003). The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. link ↗ |
| Drugi nazivi | Economic Sanctions Analysis, Sanctions Success Analysis, Sanctions Outcome Analysis, Economic Statecraft Effectiveness | Selectorate Theory, Logic of Political Survival, Winning Coalition Analysis, Selectorate Model of Governance |
| Srodne | 3 | 3 |
| Sažetak≠ | Sanctions effectiveness analysis is the systematic study of when economic sanctions achieve their political goals. Anchored by the Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, and Oegg dataset of sanctions episodes (Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd ed., 2007), it codes each case for its objectives, instruments, costs, and outcome, then analyzes which conditions — multilateral support, modest goals, target vulnerability — predict success. Because states choose when to impose sanctions and targets choose how to respond, the field is centrally concerned with the selection problems that complicate any simple verdict on whether sanctions 'work.' | Selectorate theory, developed by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph Siverson, and James Morrow in The Logic of Political Survival (2003), explains policy and foreign-policy behavior as a by-product of leaders' overriding goal: staying in power. Every leader depends on a winning coalition (W) drawn from a larger selectorate (S) of those with a say in choosing leaders. The relative size of W and S determines whether a leader buys loyalty with broad public goods or narrow private rewards — which in turn shapes growth, war, peace, and the survival of regimes. |
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