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	Nešov ekvilibrijum	VCG mehanizam
Oblast	Teorija igara	Teorija igara
Porodica	Machine learning	Machine learning
Godina nastanka	1950	1961
Tvorac	John Nash	William Vickrey, Edward Clarke, Theodore Groves
Tip	algorithm	algorithm
Temeljni izvor	Nash, J. F. (1950). Equilibrium points in N-person games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 36(1), 48-49.	Vickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed bids. The Journal of Finance, 16(1), 8-37.
Drugi nazivi	Lemke-Howson Equilibrium, Completely Labeled Pair	Vickrey Mechanism, Generalized Vickrey Auction, Truthful Mechanism
Srodne	4	4
Sažetak	Nash Equilibrium is a game-theoretic solution concept where no player can unilaterally deviate to improve their payoff. Formalized by John Nash in 1950, the Lemke-Howson algorithm computationally finds equilibria in bimatrix games by identifying completely labeled vertex pairs in the strategy polytopes.	The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) Mechanism is a truthful mechanism design solution that allocates resources and determines payments to incentivize participants to reveal their true valuations. Building on William Vickrey's 1961 sealed-bid auction work and extended by Clarke and Groves, VCG ensures that reporting truth is a dominant strategy for all participants, achieving allocative efficiency while maximizing total surplus.