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Evoluciona teorija igara×Nešov ekvilibrijum×
OblastTeorija igaraTeorija igara
PorodicaMachine learningMachine learning
Godina nastanka19731950
TvoracJohn Maynard Smith, George PriceJohn Nash
Tipalgorithmalgorithm
Temeljni izvorSmith, J. M., & Price, G. R. (1973). The logic of animal conflict. Nature, 246(5427), 15-18. DOI ↗Nash, J. F. (1950). Equilibrium points in N-person games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 36(1), 48-49. DOI ↗
Drugi naziviESS, Evolutionarily Stable Strategy, Replicator DynamicsLemke-Howson Equilibrium, Completely Labeled Pair
Srodne44
SažetakEvolutionary Game Theory applies game-theoretic reasoning to biological evolution and social dynamics, where populations of agents with different strategies interact repeatedly. Introduced by John Maynard Smith and George Price in 1973, the framework uses the concept of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESS) to identify strategy distributions that cannot be invaded by mutant strategies. Replicator dynamics describe how strategy frequencies evolve over time when reproduction is proportional to payoff success.Nash Equilibrium is a game-theoretic solution concept where no player can unilaterally deviate to improve their payoff. Formalized by John Nash in 1950, the Lemke-Howson algorithm computationally finds equilibria in bimatrix games by identifying completely labeled vertex pairs in the strategy polytopes.
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ScholarGateUporedite metode: Evolutionary Game Theory · Nash Equilibrium. Preuzeto 2026-06-18 sa https://scholargate.app/sr/compare