Causal and Mechanistic Explanation
Causal and mechanistic accounts hold that to explain a phenomenon is to identify the causes that produce it or the mechanism whose organized parts and activities bring it about.
Definition
A causal explanation accounts for a phenomenon by citing its causes or the causal relationships that would remain invariant under intervention; a mechanistic explanation does so by describing the entities, activities, and organization of a mechanism that produces the phenomenon.
Scope
This topic covers Salmon's causal-mechanical account, Woodward's interventionist theory of causal explanation, and the 'new mechanist' programme (Machamer, Darden, Craver) prominent in the biological and cognitive sciences. It addresses how appeals to causes and mechanisms resolve the relevance and asymmetry problems left open by the covering-law model.
Core questions
- What is it for one event to causally explain another?
- How do interventions help distinguish genuine causes from mere correlates?
- What are the components of a mechanism, and when is a mechanistic description explanatory?
- Do causal and mechanistic accounts subsume or replace the covering-law model?
Key concepts
- causal process
- causal interaction
- intervention
- invariance
- mechanism
- entities and activities
- constitutive relevance
Key theories
- Causal-mechanical account
- Salmon explains phenomena by tracing the causal processes that transmit marks and the causal interactions that occur within the world's causal nexus.
- Interventionist (manipulationist) account
- Woodward holds that X causally explains Y if intervening to change X would change Y, capturing explanation through invariant, manipulable relationships.
- New mechanism
- Machamer, Darden and Craver analyse mechanisms as entities and activities organized to produce regular changes, and treat describing such mechanisms as the core of explanation in the life sciences.
History
Salmon's 1984 causal-mechanical theory shifted the explanation debate from logic to ontology. Woodward's 2003 interventionist framework connected explanation to causal modelling, while the 2000 'Thinking About Mechanisms' manifesto launched the new-mechanist movement that now dominates philosophy of biology and neuroscience.
Debates
- Causes versus laws
- Mechanists and interventionists argue that local causal and mechanistic information explains even where exceptionless laws are absent, against the covering-law view that laws are indispensable.
Key figures
- Wesley Salmon
- James Woodward
- Peter Machamer
- Lindley Darden
- Carl Craver
Related topics
Seminal works
- salmon1984
- woodward2003
- mdc2000
Frequently asked questions
- How does the interventionist account handle the flagpole asymmetry?
- Intervening on the flagpole's height changes the shadow's length, but intervening on the shadow does not change the height. The asymmetry of explanation thus tracks the asymmetry of what is manipulable, which the interventionist account builds in directly.