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Echilibrul Nash×Valoarea Shapley×
DomeniuTeoria jocurilorTeoria jocurilor
FamilieMachine learningMachine learning
Anul apariției19501953
Autorul originalJohn NashLloyd Shapley
Tipalgorithmalgorithm
Sursa seminalăNash, J. F. (1950). Equilibrium points in N-person games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 36(1), 48-49. DOI ↗Shapley, L. S. (1953). A value for n-person games. In H. W. Kuhn & A. W. Tucker (Eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games II (pp. 307-317). Princeton University Press. DOI ↗
Denumiri alternativeLemke-Howson Equilibrium, Completely Labeled PairFair Division, Cooperative Game Solution, Dividend Vector
Înrudite44
RezumatNash Equilibrium is a game-theoretic solution concept where no player can unilaterally deviate to improve their payoff. Formalized by John Nash in 1950, the Lemke-Howson algorithm computationally finds equilibria in bimatrix games by identifying completely labeled vertex pairs in the strategy polytopes.The Shapley Value is a solution concept for coalition games that distributes total payoff fairly among players based on their marginal contributions to coalitions. Introduced by Lloyd Shapley in 1953, the Shapley Value is the unique payoff distribution that satisfies four intuitive axioms: efficiency (total payoff is distributed), symmetry (identical players receive equal payoff), null player (players contributing nothing receive nothing), and additivity across games.
ScholarGateSet de date
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  3. PUBLISHED

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ScholarGateCompară metode: Nash Equilibrium · Shapley Value. Preluat la 2026-06-18 de pe https://scholargate.app/ro/compare