Comparar métodos
Examine os métodos selecionados lado a lado; as linhas que diferem ficam destacadas.
| Análise de Sensibilidade com Análise de Árvore de Eventos× | Análise de Árvore de Eventos (ETA)× | |
|---|---|---|
| Área≠ | Delineamento experimental | Confiabilidade |
| Família | Process / pipeline | Process / pipeline |
| Ano de origem≠ | Combination formalized in risk and reliability engineering from the 1990s onward | 2002 |
| Autor original≠ | Sensitivity analysis: Saltelli et al. (1990s–2000s); Event tree analysis: Watson (1961, WASH-1400 formalization 1975) | Andrews & Moss |
| Tipo≠ | Hybrid quantitative risk analysis method | Forward inductive logic tree |
| Fonte seminal≠ | Saltelli, A., Ratto, M., Andres, T., Campolongo, F., Cariboni, J., Gatelli, D., Saisana, M., & Tarantola, S. (2008). Global Sensitivity Analysis: The Primer. Wiley. ISBN: 978-0470059975 | Andrews, J. D., & Moss, T. R. (2002). Reliability and Risk Assessment (2nd ed.). Professional Engineering Publishing. ISBN: 978-1-86058-290-5 |
| Outros nomes | SA-ETA, ETA sensitivity analysis, event tree sensitivity analysis, probabilistic sensitivity analysis with ETA | ETA, Event Sequence Diagram Analysis, Initiating Event Analysis, Olay Ağacı Analizi |
| Relacionados≠ | 6 | 2 |
| Resumo≠ | Sensitivity analysis with event tree analysis (SA-ETA) is a quantitative risk assessment approach that systematically varies the input probabilities of an event tree model to determine which branch probabilities or initiating event frequencies most strongly influence the calculated probability of undesired outcomes. It extends classical event tree analysis by ranking the uncertainty contributions of individual inputs, thereby guiding risk-reduction efforts toward the parameters that matter most. | Event Tree Analysis (ETA) is a forward inductive technique used in reliability and risk engineering to model the possible outcomes that follow an initiating event. Starting from a single undesired event, ETA traces all subsequent event sequences through a binary branching tree representing the success or failure of safety barriers and protective systems. Introduced formally in reliability and risk literature by Andrews and Moss (2002), it is widely applied in nuclear, chemical, and aerospace industries to quantify accident sequence probabilities and guide safety decision-making. |
| ScholarGateConjunto de dados ↗ |
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