Comparar métodos
Examine os métodos selecionados lado a lado; as linhas que diferem ficam destacadas.
| Comparative Foreign Policy Analysis× | Two-Level Game Analysis× | |
|---|---|---|
| Área≠ | International Relations | Political Science |
| Família≠ | Process / pipeline | MCDM |
| Ano de origem≠ | 2005 | 1988 |
| Autor original≠ | James Rosenau (CFP); Valerie Hudson and the Foreign Policy Analysis tradition | Robert D. Putnam |
| Tipo≠ | Comparative, multi-level explanation of foreign-policy behavior | Framework for analyzing international negotiation under domestic constraints |
| Fonte seminal≠ | Hudson, V. M. (2005). Foreign policy analysis: Actor-specific theory and the ground of international relations. Foreign Policy Analysis, 1(1), 1–30. DOI ↗ | Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. International Organization, 42(3), 427-460. DOI ↗ |
| Outros nomes | Comparative Foreign Policy, CFP Analysis, Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), Comparative Study of Foreign Policy Behavior | Two-Level Games, Putnam Two-Level Game Framework, Win-Set Analysis, Double-Edged Diplomacy |
| Relacionados≠ | 3 | 4 |
| Resumo≠ | Comparative Foreign Policy (CFP) analysis explains the foreign-policy behavior of states by opening the 'black box' of decision making and comparing how foreign policy is produced across countries, leaders, and contexts. Part of the broader Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) tradition that Valerie Hudson (2005) characterizes as actor-specific theory, it draws on factors at multiple levels — individual leaders, small groups and bureaucracies, domestic society, and the international system — to account for why different states (or the same state at different times) behave as they do. Its hallmark is the systematic comparison of decision processes and outputs. | Two-level game analysis is a framework introduced by Robert Putnam in 1988 for understanding how international negotiations are jointly shaped by bargaining between governments and the need to win domestic approval. A negotiator plays simultaneously at two tables: Level I, where states bargain over an agreement, and Level II, where that agreement must be ratified by domestic constituents. The key analytic device is the win-set — the set of Level I deals that could secure domestic ratification — and an agreement is possible only where the negotiating states' win-sets overlap. |
| ScholarGateConjunto de dados ↗ |
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