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| Najlepsze Cykle Handlowe× | Mechanizm VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves)× | |
|---|---|---|
| Dziedzina | Teoria gier | Teoria gier |
| Rodzina | Machine learning | Machine learning |
| Rok powstania≠ | 1974 | 1961 |
| Twórca≠ | Lloyd Shapley, Herbert Scarf | William Vickrey, Edward Clarke, Theodore Groves |
| Typ | algorithm | algorithm |
| Źródło pierwotne≠ | Shapley, L. S., & Scarf, H. (1974). On cores and indivisibility. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1(1), 23-37. DOI ↗ | Vickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed bids. The Journal of Finance, 16(1), 8-37. DOI ↗ |
| Inne nazwy | TTC, Shapley-Scarf Algorithm, Efficient Exchange | Vickrey Mechanism, Generalized Vickrey Auction, Truthful Mechanism |
| Pokrewne | 4 | 4 |
| Podsumowanie≠ | Top Trading Cycles (TTC) is an algorithm for allocating indivisible goods to agents such that the allocation is Pareto efficient and individually rational. Developed by Lloyd Shapley and Herbert Scarf in 1974, the algorithm identifies cycles of trades in a preference digraph, executes those trades, and iteratively repeats until no further trades are beneficial. TTC is widely used in kidney exchange and housing allocation due to its efficiency and implementation simplicity. | The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) Mechanism is a truthful mechanism design solution that allocates resources and determines payments to incentivize participants to reveal their true valuations. Building on William Vickrey's 1961 sealed-bid auction work and extended by Clarke and Groves, VCG ensures that reporting truth is a dominant strategy for all participants, achieving allocative efficiency while maximizing total surplus. |
| ScholarGateZbiór danych ↗ |
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