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Przeglądaj wybrane metody obok siebie; wiersze, które się różnią, są wyróżnione.
| Modele dyfuzji sieciowej× | Analiza odporności i podatności sieci× | |
|---|---|---|
| Dziedzina | Analiza sieci | Analiza sieci |
| Rodzina | Process / pipeline | Process / pipeline |
| Rok powstania≠ | 1927 (epidemiological compartmental); 2003 (social influence cascade) | 2000 |
| Twórca≠ | Kermack & McKendrick (SIR/SIS, 1927); Kempe, Kleinberg & Tardos (Independent Cascade, 2003) | Albert, Jeong & Barabási |
| Typ≠ | Stochastic / deterministic simulation on graphs | Network robustness / vulnerability framework |
| Źródło pierwotne≠ | Kermack, W.O. & McKendrick, A.G. (1927). A Contribution to the Mathematical Theory of Epidemics. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series A, 115(772), 700-721. DOI ↗ | Albert, R., Jeong, H. & Barabási, A.L. (2000). Error and attack tolerance of complex networks. Nature, 406, 378–382. DOI ↗ |
| Inne nazwy≠ | epidemic spreading models, compartmental models, influence propagation models, Ağ Yayılım Modelleri (SIR, SIS, Independent Cascade) | network vulnerability analysis, attack tolerance analysis, Ağ Dayanıklılığı ve Güvenlik Açığı Analizi |
| Pokrewne | 5 | 5 |
| Podsumowanie≠ | Network diffusion models are a family of compartmental and probabilistic frameworks that simulate how information, disease, or innovation spreads across a connected system. Rooted in the mathematical epidemiology of Kermack and McKendrick (1927), the SIR and SIS models partition nodes into states and track transitions driven by contact rates and recovery probabilities. The Independent Cascade and Linear Threshold models, formalised by Kempe, Kleinberg, and Tardos (2003), extend this logic to social influence, modelling how activation propagates through a network one neighbour at a time. | Network resilience and vulnerability analysis is an analytical framework, formalised by Albert, Jeong, and Barabási (2000), that measures how a network degrades functionally as nodes or edges are progressively removed. By running targeted-attack simulations — removing the highest-centrality nodes first — and random-failure simulations — removing nodes at uniform probability — the framework identifies which structural elements are critical to network integrity and where infrastructure is most exposed. |
| ScholarGateZbiór danych ↗ |
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