Porównaj metody

	Common-Pool Resource Analysis	Veto Player Analysis
Dziedzina	Political Economy	Political Science
Rodzina	MCDM	MCDM
Rok powstania	1990	1995
Twórca	Garrett Hardin & Elinor Ostrom	George Tsebelis
Typ	Institutional analysis framework for shared resources	Comparative institutional analysis framework
Źródło pierwotne	Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge University Press. ISBN: 9780521405997	Tsebelis, G. (2002). Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton University Press. ISBN: 9780691091891
Inne nazwy	Commons Governance Analysis, Ostrom Design Principles, Tragedy of the Commons Analysis, CPR Analysis	Veto Players Theory, Veto Points Analysis, Tsebelis Veto Player Framework, Policy Stability Analysis
Pokrewne	4	4
Podsumowanie	Common-pool resource (CPR) analysis is a framework for diagnosing why shared natural and man-made resources are prone to overuse and for identifying the institutional conditions under which user communities can govern them sustainably without privatization or top-down state control. A common-pool resource is rivalrous (one user's consumption subtracts from what is available to others) yet costly to exclude users from. Garrett Hardin's 1968 'tragedy of the commons' framed the pessimistic baseline in which rational appropriators collectively destroy the resource, while Elinor Ostrom's 1990 Governing the Commons established, through extensive empirical work, eight design principles that distinguish durable self-governing commons from those that collapse.	Veto player analysis is a spatial-institutional framework, developed by George Tsebelis in his 1995 article and 2002 book, for predicting the capacity of a political system to change policy. A veto player is any individual or collective actor whose agreement is required to alter the status quo. The theory shows that the potential for policy change shrinks as the number of veto players grows, as the ideological distance between them widens, and as their internal cohesion increases — three structural variables that together determine a system's policy stability independently of constitutional labels such as presidentialism or parliamentarism.