Sammenlign metoder
Gjennomgå de valgte metodene side om side; rader som avviker, er uthevet.
| Bureaucratic Reputation Analysis× | Regulatory Enforcement Analysis× | |
|---|---|---|
| Fagfelt | Public Administration | Public Administration |
| Familie | Process / pipeline | Process / pipeline |
| Opprinnelsesår≠ | 2001 | 1992 |
| Opphavsperson≠ | Daniel P. Carpenter | Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite |
| Type≠ | Theoretical analytical framework | Analytical / strategic framework |
| Opprinnelig kilde≠ | Carpenter, D. P. (2001). The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862–1928. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ISBN: 9780691070100 | Ayres, I., & Braithwaite, J. (1992). Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN: 9780195070705 |
| Alias | Agency Reputation Analysis, Reputational Theory of Bureaucracy, Organizational Reputation Analysis, Carpenter Reputation Framework | Responsive Regulation Analysis, Enforcement Pyramid Analysis, Compliance and Enforcement Analysis, Regulatory Strategy Analysis |
| Relaterte | 4 | 4 |
| Sammendrag≠ | Bureaucratic reputation analysis is an analytical framework for explaining the behaviour, power and autonomy of public agencies through the lens of their reputation — the set of symbolic beliefs about an agency's capacities, intentions and history held by its many audiences. Developed by Daniel Carpenter, notably in his 2001 study of how U.S. executive agencies forged autonomy, and elaborated with George Krause, the framework treats reputation as a strategic asset that agencies cultivate and protect. It distinguishes performative, moral, technical and procedural dimensions of reputation and traces how reputational concerns drive what agencies do. | Regulatory enforcement analysis examines how regulators secure compliance — when they persuade, when they punish, and how they choose between the two. Its central framework is responsive regulation, set out by Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite in their 1992 book, which argues that enforcement should be tit-for-tat and proportionate: start with dialogue and persuasion, but escalate up an enforcement pyramid to warnings, civil penalties, licence suspension and ultimately prohibition for actors who persist in non-compliance. The analysis maps a regulator's strategies onto this pyramid and assesses how well its responses are matched to the motivations of the regulated. |
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