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Nash-evenwicht×Shapley-waarde×
VakgebiedSpeltheorieSpeltheorie
FamilieMachine learningMachine learning
Jaar van ontstaan19501953
GrondleggerJohn NashLloyd Shapley
Typealgorithmalgorithm
Oorspronkelijke bronNash, J. F. (1950). Equilibrium points in N-person games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 36(1), 48-49. DOI ↗Shapley, L. S. (1953). A value for n-person games. In H. W. Kuhn & A. W. Tucker (Eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games II (pp. 307-317). Princeton University Press. DOI ↗
AliassenLemke-Howson Equilibrium, Completely Labeled PairFair Division, Cooperative Game Solution, Dividend Vector
Verwant44
SamenvattingNash Equilibrium is a game-theoretic solution concept where no player can unilaterally deviate to improve their payoff. Formalized by John Nash in 1950, the Lemke-Howson algorithm computationally finds equilibria in bimatrix games by identifying completely labeled vertex pairs in the strategy polytopes.The Shapley Value is a solution concept for coalition games that distributes total payoff fairly among players based on their marginal contributions to coalitions. Introduced by Lloyd Shapley in 1953, the Shapley Value is the unique payoff distribution that satisfies four intuitive axioms: efficiency (total payoff is distributed), symmetry (identical players receive equal payoff), null player (players contributing nothing receive nothing), and additivity across games.
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ScholarGateMethoden vergelijken: Nash Equilibrium · Shapley Value. Geraadpleegd op 2026-06-18 via https://scholargate.app/nl/compare