Methoden vergelijken
Bekijk de geselecteerde methoden naast elkaar; rijen die verschillen zijn gemarkeerd.
| Deterrence Modeling× | Bargaining Model of War× | |
|---|---|---|
| Vakgebied | International Relations | International Relations |
| Familie | MCDM | MCDM |
| Jaar van ontstaan≠ | 2000 | 1995 |
| Grondlegger≠ | Classical deterrence theorists (Schelling); formal perfect deterrence by Frank Zagare & D. Marc Kilgour | James D. Fearon |
| Type≠ | Game-theoretic model of threat-based conflict prevention | Formal model of war as bargaining failure |
| Oorspronkelijke bron≠ | Zagare, F. C., & Kilgour, D. M. (2000). Perfect Deterrence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. link ↗ | Fearon, J. D. (1995). Rationalist explanations for war. International Organization, 49(3), 379–414. DOI ↗ |
| Aliassen | Deterrence Theory Modeling, Rational Deterrence Models, Perfect Deterrence Game, Extended Deterrence Analysis | Rationalist Explanations for War, Bargaining Theory of War, Crisis Bargaining Model, Fearon Bargaining Model |
| Verwant | 3 | 3 |
| Samenvatting≠ | Deterrence modeling uses game theory to analyze when a defender can dissuade a challenger from aggression by threatening unacceptable costs. Classical deterrence theory, rooted in Schelling's work and Cold War nuclear strategy, was reformulated by Frank Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour in Perfect Deterrence (2000) into a family of incomplete-information games. These models make precise the two requirements a deterrent threat must meet — capability (the means to inflict the cost) and credibility (a genuine willingness to carry it out) — and identify the equilibrium conditions under which deterrence succeeds, fails, or collapses into conflict. | The bargaining model of war, given its canonical statement by James Fearon in 'Rationalist Explanations for War' (1995), treats war not as the failure of reason but as a failure of bargaining. Because fighting is costly and uncertain, there almost always exists a peaceful division of the disputed stakes that both rational states would prefer to the gamble of war. The puzzle, and the model's central contribution, is to identify the specific conditions — private information with incentives to misrepresent, commitment problems, and issue indivisibility — under which rational, unitary states nonetheless fail to reach such a settlement. |
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