Compatibilism

Compatibilism holds that free will and moral responsibility are consistent with causal determinism. This topic examines the leading compatibilist analyses of the freedom that matters.

Definition

Compatibilism is the thesis that an agent can act freely and be morally responsible even if determinism is true, because the relevant freedom is a kind of control rather than the ability to do otherwise in an indeterministic sense.

Scope

Covers classical conditional analyses of freedom, Frankfurt's hierarchical theory and his attack on the principle of alternative possibilities, reasons-responsiveness theories, and semicompatibilism about responsibility.

Core questions

• What kind of freedom is required for responsibility?
• Is the ability to do otherwise necessary for free action?
• How do higher-order desires bear on freedom of the will?
• Can responsibility be defended even if free will requires alternatives?

Key concepts

• Soft determinism
• Conditional analysis
• Higher-order desire
• Reasons-responsiveness
• Guidance control
• Principle of alternative possibilities

Key theories

Classical conditional analysis

Soft determinists such as Ayer analyze 'could have done otherwise' as a conditional: an agent acts freely when their action flows from their own desires and they would have acted differently had they chosen to.

Hierarchical (mesh) theory

Frankfurt holds that a person acts of their own free will when their effective first-order desire is the one they want to be effective, so freedom is a matter of harmony between desires and higher-order volitions.

Reasons-responsiveness and semicompatibilism

Fischer and Ravizza ground responsibility in guidance control exercised through a moderately reasons-responsive mechanism, defending responsibility even if determinism rules out alternatives.

History

Classical compatibilism, with roots in Hobbes and Hume, was defended by Ayer in the mid-twentieth century via a conditional analysis of 'could have done otherwise'. Frankfurt's 1971 hierarchical theory and his cases against the principle of alternative possibilities reshaped the field, leading to reasons-responsiveness and semicompatibilist theories.

Debates

Does responsibility require alternative possibilities?

Frankfurt-style cases purport to show an agent can be responsible even when unable to do otherwise; defenders of the principle of alternative possibilities dispute these cases, fueling the divide between leeway and source compatibilism.

Key figures

• A. J. Ayer
• Harry Frankfurt
• John Martin Fischer
• Mark Ravizza
• Susan Wolf

Seminal works

• frankfurt1971
• fischer1998

Frequently asked questions

What is a Frankfurt case?

A Frankfurt case is a thought experiment in which a counterfactual intervener would have forced an agent to act a certain way had the agent shown signs of deciding otherwise, but does not intervene because the agent acts that way on their own. Such cases aim to show responsibility without the ability to do otherwise.