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Keseimbangan Sempurna Subpermainan×Teori Permainan Evolusioner×
BidangTeori PermainanTeori Permainan
KeluargaMachine learningMachine learning
Tahun asal19651973
PengasasReinhard SeltenJohn Maynard Smith, George Price
Jenisalgorithmalgorithm
Sumber perintisSelten, R. (1965). Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfrageträgheit. Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 121, 301-324. link ↗Smith, J. M., & Price, G. R. (1973). The logic of animal conflict. Nature, 246(5427), 15-18. DOI ↗
AliasBackward Induction, Sequential Equilibrium, Extensive-Form EquilibriumESS, Evolutionarily Stable Strategy, Replicator Dynamics
Berkaitan44
RingkasanSubgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) is a refinement of Nash Equilibrium for sequential games, introduced by Reinhard Selten in 1965. It requires that strategy profiles constitute a Nash Equilibrium in every subgame, eliminating non-credible threats and incredible promises. Backward induction is the primary computational method for finding SPE in finite games.Evolutionary Game Theory applies game-theoretic reasoning to biological evolution and social dynamics, where populations of agents with different strategies interact repeatedly. Introduced by John Maynard Smith and George Price in 1973, the framework uses the concept of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESS) to identify strategy distributions that cannot be invaded by mutant strategies. Replicator dynamics describe how strategy frequencies evolve over time when reproduction is proportional to payoff success.
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ScholarGateBandingkan kaedah: Subgame Perfect Equilibrium · Evolutionary Game Theory. Dicapai 2026-06-18 daripada https://scholargate.app/ms/compare