Reference and Meaning
How do words hook onto the world, and what is the meaning of a name, a description, or a sentence? This area concerns the logical core of the philosophy of language.
Definition
A theory of reference and meaning explains how expressions designate objects (reference) and what they contribute to the truth conditions and cognitive significance of sentences (meaning), including how names, descriptions, indexicals, and attitude reports function.
Scope
This area covers the theory of reference and linguistic meaning where it bears most directly on logic. It treats Frege's distinction between sense and reference, Russell's theory of descriptions and its logical analysis of denoting phrases, the descriptivist-versus-causal debate about how names refer, the semantics of context-sensitive expressions such as indexicals and demonstratives, and the logical puzzles posed by propositional-attitude contexts where co-referring terms cannot be freely substituted.
Sub-topics
Core questions
- Do meaningful expressions have a sense distinct from their reference?
- How do proper names refer — by associated descriptions or by causal-historical chains?
- What is the logical form of sentences containing definite descriptions?
- Why does substitution of co-referring terms fail in belief and other attitude contexts?
Key concepts
- sense (Sinn) and reference (Bedeutung)
- rigid designation
- definite descriptions
- descriptivism vs. the causal theory
- indexicality and context
- referential opacity
Key theories
- Sense and reference
- Frege distinguishes the reference of an expression (the object it stands for) from its sense (its mode of presentation), explaining how 'a = a' and 'a = b' can differ in cognitive value even when a and b co-refer.
- Causal-historical theory of names
- Kripke argues that proper names are rigid designators whose reference is fixed not by descriptions but by an initial baptism and a causal chain of communication preserving the link to the bearer.
History
Frege's 1892 distinction and Russell's 1905 theory of descriptions set the agenda for analytic philosophy of language. The mid-twentieth century saw Strawson's critique of Russell and the rise of the causal theory of reference in Kripke, Putnam, and Donnellan, while Kaplan's logic of demonstratives systematized the semantics of context-dependence.
Debates
- Descriptivism vs. the causal theory of reference
- Whether the reference of a name is mediated by descriptions speakers associate with it (Frege-Russell descriptivism) or fixed directly by a causal-historical chain independent of any description (Kripke-Putnam), with implications for meaning, modality, and identity statements.
Key figures
- Gottlob Frege
- Bertrand Russell
- Saul Kripke
- David Kaplan
- Hilary Putnam
- Ruth Barcan Marcus
Related topics
Seminal works
- frege1892
- russell1905
- kripke1980
Frequently asked questions
- What is the difference between sense and reference?
- Reference is the object an expression stands for; sense is its mode of presentation, the way that object is given. 'The morning star' and 'the evening star' share a reference (Venus) but differ in sense, which is why learning they are identical is informative rather than trivial.