Deterrence Analysis
Deterrence analysis studies how the threat and imposition of legal punishment discourage crime. Rooted in classical criminology and formalized in Gary Becker's economic model, it distinguishes the certainty, severity, and celerity of punishment, separates perceived from objective sanction risk, and uses quasi-experimental and perceptual evidence — synthesized by Daniel Nagin — to test how much, and through what channels, punishment actually deters.
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Avoti
- Nagin, D. S. (2013). Deterrence in the twenty-first century: A review of the evidence. Crime and Justice, 42(1), 199–263. DOI: 10.1086/670398 ↗
- Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and punishment: An economic approach. Journal of Political Economy, 76(2), 169–217. DOI: 10.1086/259394 ↗
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ScholarGate. (2026, June 22). Deterrence Theory and Analysis of Crime. ScholarGate. https://scholargate.app/lv/criminology/deterrence-analysis
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