ScholarGate
Asistents
Process / pipelineRational-choice / criminal-justice policy analysis

Deterrence Analysis

Deterrence analysis studies how the threat and imposition of legal punishment discourage crime. Rooted in classical criminology and formalized in Gary Becker's economic model, it distinguishes the certainty, severity, and celerity of punishment, separates perceived from objective sanction risk, and uses quasi-experimental and perceptual evidence — synthesized by Daniel Nagin — to test how much, and through what channels, punishment actually deters.

Atvērt MethodMindDrīzumāLietojiet, salīdziniet, saņemiet norādījumus
Rīki un resursi
Lejupielādēt slaidus
Mācieties un izpētiet
VideoDrīzumā

Lasīt pilno metodes aprakstu

Tikai dalībniekiem

Piesakieties ar bezmaksas kontu, lai lasītu šo sadaļu.

Pieteikties

Metožu karte

Saistīto metožu apkaime — atlasiet mezglu, lai izpētītu.

Avoti

  1. Nagin, D. S. (2013). Deterrence in the twenty-first century: A review of the evidence. Crime and Justice, 42(1), 199–263. DOI: 10.1086/670398
  2. Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and punishment: An economic approach. Journal of Political Economy, 76(2), 169–217. DOI: 10.1086/259394

Kā citēt šo lapu

ScholarGate. (2026, June 22). Deterrence Theory and Analysis of Crime. ScholarGate. https://scholargate.app/lv/criminology/deterrence-analysis

Kura metode?

Novietojiet šo metodi blakus tās tuvākajām radniecīgajām metodēm un lasiet tās līdzās — bibliotēka noliek grāmatas uz galda; izvēle ir jūsu.

Salīdzināt blakus

Uz to atsaucas

ScholarGateDeterrence Analysis (Deterrence Theory and Analysis of Crime). Izgūts 2026-06-24 no https://scholargate.app/lv/criminology/deterrence-analysis · Datu kopa: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20539026