Salīdzināt metodes

	Power Resources Analysis	Veto Player Analysis
Nozare	Political Economy	Political Science
Saime	Process / pipeline	MCDM
Izcelsmes gads	1983	1995
Autors	Walter Korpi & Gosta Esping-Andersen	George Tsebelis
Tips	Comparative political economy theory	Comparative institutional analysis framework
Pirmavots	Korpi, W. (1983). The Democratic Class Struggle. Routledge & Kegan Paul. ISBN: 9780710094490	Tsebelis, G. (2002). Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton University Press. ISBN: 9780691091891
Citi nosaukumi	Power Resources Theory, Power Resource Approach, Class Mobilization Theory, Korpi Power Resources Model	Veto Players Theory, Veto Points Analysis, Tsebelis Veto Player Framework, Policy Stability Analysis
Saistītās	4	4
Kopsavilkums	Power resources analysis is a comparative political-economy framework, developed above all by Walter Korpi in The Democratic Class Struggle (1983) and extended by Gosta Esping-Andersen in The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990), that explains the size and shape of welfare states by the distribution of power resources between social classes. Its central claim is that under democratic capitalism the working class can offset capital's structural advantage in markets by mobilizing political power resources — above all the organizational strength of trade unions and the governing strength of left and labor parties. Where labor is strongly organized and durably in government, it builds class coalitions that translate that power into generous, redistributive social policy and a high degree of decommodification: the extent to which citizens can maintain a livelihood without depending on the market.	Veto player analysis is a spatial-institutional framework, developed by George Tsebelis in his 1995 article and 2002 book, for predicting the capacity of a political system to change policy. A veto player is any individual or collective actor whose agreement is required to alter the status quo. The theory shows that the potential for policy change shrinks as the number of veto players grows, as the ideological distance between them widens, and as their internal cohesion increases — three structural variables that together determine a system's policy stability independently of constitutional labels such as presidentialism or parliamentarism.