手法を比較

	Upper Echelons (TMT) Analysis	Merger and Acquisition Performance Event Study
分野	経営戦略論	経営戦略論
系統	Process / pipeline	Process / pipeline
提唱年	1984	2001
提唱者	Donald C. Hambrick & Phyllis A. Mason	Gregor Andrade, Mark Mitchell & Erik Stafford; David King, Dan Dalton, Catherine Daily & Jeffrey Covin
種類	Demography-to-strategy pipeline linking executive characteristics to organizational outcomes	Event-study pipeline for the wealth effects of merger and acquisition announcements
原典	Hambrick, D. C., & Mason, P. A. (1984). Upper echelons: The organization as a reflection of its top managers. Academy of Management Review, 9(2), 193-206.	Andrade, G., Mitchell, M., & Stafford, E. (2001). New evidence and perspectives on mergers. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(2), 103-120.
別名	Top Management Team Demography Analysis, Upper Echelons Theory Testing, TMT Characteristics Analysis, Executive Demographic Analysis	M&A Abnormal Returns Analysis, Acquisition Announcement Event Study, Acquirer-Target Wealth Effects Analysis, Deal Announcement CAR Analysis
関連	3	3
概要	Upper echelons analysis tests the proposition that organizations become reflections of their top managers: that the strategic choices a firm makes and the performance it achieves can be partly predicted from the observable characteristics of its top management team. Hambrick and Mason's 1984 Academy of Management Review article launched this perspective, arguing that because executives act on their construed view of complex situations, their experiences, values, and personalities shape outcomes — and that hard-to-measure cognitions can be proxied by observable traits such as age, tenure, functional background, and education. Hambrick's 2007 update sharpened the theory, emphasizing managerial discretion and executive job demands as the conditions under which executive characteristics matter most. The analysis links team demography to strategy and performance.	A merger and acquisition event study measures the stock-market reaction to a deal announcement to infer how much value the deal is expected to create or destroy for acquirers and targets. The logic is that in an efficient market the share-price jump around the announcement capitalizes investors' revised expectations of future cash flows attributable to the deal. Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford's 2001 survey distilled the empirical regularities: targets earn large positive abnormal returns, combined acquirer-plus-target returns are modestly positive, while acquirers themselves often earn around zero or slightly negative returns. King, Dalton, Daily and Covin's 2004 meta-analysis confirmed that acquirers, on average, do not gain and pointed to unidentified moderators, motivating cross-sectional models that link abnormal returns to deal and firm characteristics.