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| Gale-Shapleyアルゴリズム× | Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) メカニズム× | |
|---|---|---|
| 分野 | ゲーム理論 | ゲーム理論 |
| 系統 | Machine learning | Machine learning |
| 提唱年≠ | 1962 | 1961 |
| 提唱者≠ | David Gale, Lloyd Shapley | William Vickrey, Edward Clarke, Theodore Groves |
| 種類 | algorithm | algorithm |
| 原典≠ | Gale, D., & Shapley, L. S. (1962). College admissions and the stability of marriage. The American Mathematical Monthly, 69(1), 9-15. DOI ↗ | Vickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed bids. The Journal of Finance, 16(1), 8-37. DOI ↗ |
| 別名 | Stable Marriage Problem, Deferred Acceptance, Two-Sided Matching | Vickrey Mechanism, Generalized Vickrey Auction, Truthful Mechanism |
| 関連 | 4 | 4 |
| 概要≠ | The Gale-Shapley algorithm solves the stable marriage problem: how to match two groups (e.g., medical residents to hospitals, students to schools) such that no pair prefers each other to their assigned partners. Introduced by David Gale and Lloyd Shapley in 1962, the algorithm guarantees a stable matching in polynomial time through a deferred acceptance process where one side proposes sequentially and the other side responds, revising choices as better options arrive. | The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) Mechanism is a truthful mechanism design solution that allocates resources and determines payments to incentivize participants to reveal their true valuations. Building on William Vickrey's 1961 sealed-bid auction work and extended by Clarke and Groves, VCG ensures that reporting truth is a dominant strategy for all participants, achieving allocative efficiency while maximizing total surplus. |
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