手法を比較

	Fiscal Sociology Analysis	Redistribution Preference Analysis
分野	Political Economy	Political Economy
系統	Process / pipeline	Regression model
提唱年	1918	1981
提唱者	Joseph Schumpeter; Charles Tilly; Martin, Mehrotra & Prasad	Allan Meltzer & Scott Richard (self-interest); Roland Benabou & Efe Ok (mobility/POUM)
種類	Historical-comparative analytical framework	Individual-level survey regression of redistribution attitudes
原典	Schumpeter, J. A. (1918/1991). The Crisis of the Tax State. In R. Swedberg (Ed.), The Economics and Sociology of Capitalism. Princeton University Press. ISBN: 9780691003832	Meltzer, A. H., & Richard, S. F. (1981). A Rational Theory of the Size of Government. Journal of Political Economy, 89(5), 914-927.
別名	Fiscal Sociology, New Fiscal Sociology, Sociology of Taxation	Demand for Redistribution Analysis, Redistribution Attitudes Regression, Preferences for Redistribution Model, Support for Redistribution Analysis
関連	3	3
概要	Fiscal sociology analysis treats taxation not as a narrow technical matter but as a window onto state-society relations and the formation of the state itself. The tradition descends from Joseph Schumpeter's 1918 essay The Crisis of the Tax State, with its dictum that the fiscal history of a people is above all an essential part of its general history, and from the historical-sociological work of Charles Tilly (1990) linking war, capital, and the building of European states. The New Fiscal Sociology of Martin, Mehrotra, and Prasad (2009) revived and reframed the field, arguing that taxes are social contracts as much as revenue instruments: how a state taxes reveals who holds power, what bargains bind rulers and ruled, and what the polity is capable of. The method reads the tax system as a record of social structure, conflict, and the reciprocal making of states and citizens.	Redistribution preference analysis examines why individuals support or oppose government efforts to reduce inequality. The self-interest baseline comes from Meltzer and Richard's 1981 model, in which the demand for redistribution falls with one's own income because the rich pay more and receive less from transfers. Benabou and Ok's 2001 POUM (prospect of upward mobility) hypothesis adds a forward-looking twist: people who expect to climb the income ladder may oppose redistribution even when currently poor, because they anticipate being net payers tomorrow. A third strand emphasizes beliefs about fairness — whether success reflects effort or luck. The empirical method is an individual-level survey regression, typically ordered logit or multilevel, of redistribution attitudes on income, mobility expectations, beliefs, and contextual factors.